The ultimate aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) is improving the transmission distance and key generation speed. Unfortunately, it is believed to be limited by the secret-key capacity of quantum channel without quantum repeater. Recently, a novel twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) is proposed to break through the limit, where the key rate is proportional to the square-root of channel transmittance. Here, by using the vacuum and one-photon state as a qubit, we show that the TF-QKD can be regarded as a measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) with single-photon Bell state measurement. Therefore, the MDI property of TF-QKD can be understood clearly. Importantly, the universal security proof theories can be directly used for TF-QKD, such as BB84 encoding, six-state encoding and referenceframe-independent scheme. Furthermore, we propose a feasible experimental scheme for the proof-of-principle experimental demonstration.
to quantum computing attacks. The one-time pad is the only provably secure cryptosystem according to information theory known today. Thereinto, an important issue exists that the common secret key is at least as long as the message itself and can be used only once. Quantum key distribution (QKD) constitutes the only way to solve the real time key distribution problem 1 . QKD allows two distant parties to establish a string of secret keys with information-theoretic security 2, 3 .
One can ensure legitimate parties to exchange messages with perfect confidentiality by combining QKD with one-time pad.
The longest transmission distance of QKD has been implemented over 421 km with ultralowloss optical fiber 4 and 1200 km satellite-to-ground 5 . Improving the transmission distance and key rate are the most important tasks of QKD research. However, this task has been proven impossible beyond a certain limit without quantum repeaters 6, 7 . The secret-key capacity of quantum channel can be used to bound the extractable maximum secret key 6, 7 . Generally, the secret-key capacity can be regarded as a linear key rate Pirandola-Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound 7 R PLOB = − log 2 (1 − η), where η is the transmittance. To overcome the rate-distance limit of QKD, quantum repeaters are usually believed as a strong candidate 8, 9 . However, the long-time quantum memory and high-fidelity entanglement distillation are far from feasible. Despite the recent advance 10 relaxing the requirement, the actual implementation is also difficult to realize, for example, quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement. Although the trusted relay-based QKD has been deployed over 2000 km 11 , its security is compromised. Bell state is enough to prove the security. When Charlie performs a successful BSM, the qubit that the legitimate users hold becomes a single-photon Bell state, the process of which can be regarded as an entanglement swapping, as experimentally demonstrated 30 . Alice and Bob can utilize quantum memory to store their qubit a and b modes. After Charlie announces the events through public channels whether he has obtained a Bell state and which Bell state he has identified, Alice and
Bob will measure qubit a and b modes, respectively. They publish the basis information through an authenticated classical channel. Bob will apply a bit flip when they choose Z (X or Y ) basis and Charlie receives a Bell state |ψ ± AB (|ψ − AB ). They use the data of Z basis to form the raw key, while the data of other bases are all used to estimate the leaked information. Alice and Bob can acquire the secure key through the error correction and privacy amplification.
We can equivalently convert our entanglement-based protocol in Fig. 1(a) to the prepareand-measure protocol as shown in Fig. 1 To solve this issue, Alice and Bob need to decrease the probability of qubit |1 preparation and increase the probability of qubit |0 preparation. Therefore, Alice (Bob) should exploit the entangled state |ψ t = √ 1 − t |0 |1 + √ t |1 |0 to replace the maximally entangled state |ψ + = (|0 |1 + |1 |0 )/ √ 2 in the entanglement-based protocol with Fig. 1(a) , where t is the transmittance of partial BS. Note that the non-maximally entangled state is also used to prove the security in the TF-QKD 18 . Taking into account the threshold detector and lossy channel, the joint quantum state of Alice's a mode and Bob's b mode after Charlie's BSM with |ψ ± AB under the case without eavesdropper's disturbance can be written as (see Methods for detail)
where q = q 0 +q 1 +q 2 , q 0 , q 1 and q 2 are the probabilities of Charlie's successful BSM given that the photon numbers of TF state are zero, one and two. Consider a virtual step, if Alice and Bob jointly perform QND measurement on TF state to implement photon-number-resolving before they send TF state to Charlie, the joint quantum state of Alice's a mode and Bob's b mode is |ψ ± ab given that the TF state with one-photon and Charlie's BSM with |ψ ± AB , which reduces to the the case of ideal detector and lossless channel.
Similarly, we can have a equivalent prepare-and-measure protocol corresponding to the entanglement-based protocol with entangled state
prepares the qubit |+z = |0 and |−z = |1 with probability 1 − t and t as Z basis logic bit 0 and 1, respectively. Alice (Bob) prepares the qubit |+x
with equal probability as X basis logic bit 0 and 1, respectively. Alice (Bob)
prepares the qubit |+y 
where
the binary Shannon entropy and e b1 XX is the QBER in X basis for TF state with one-photon. We can have optimal secure key rate in Eq. (2) with the transmittance of partial BS t ≈ 8% given that QBER e b1 XX = 3%, dark count rate of threshold detector p d = 10 −6 , efficiency of threshold detector η d = 40% and the fiber distance between Alice and Bob L ≥ 100 km. Note that the entanglement-based protocol in Fig. 1(a) and prepare-and-measure protocol in Fig. 1(b) are the virtual protocols, which are not used to perform experiment but prove the security in theory. Efficient TF-QKD. Here, we propose an efficient TF-QKD that the single-photon source used for Z basis and laser source used for phase-encoding basis in Fig. 1(c) . The qubit prepared in Z basis can be implemented by turning on and off (such as optical switch) the single-photon source, while the qubit of phase encoding basis should exploit the phase-randomized coherent state combined with phase modulation. However, the perfect single-photon source is still a challenge under the current technology. Therefore, we propose a practical TF-QKD by exploiting phaserandomized coherent state to replace single-photon source used for Z basis encoding.
Practical TF-QKD. In the following, let us explain our practical TF-QKD in detail as shown 
Bob use the data of Z basis as the raw key, while the data of phase-encoding basis are announced to estimate the amount of leaked information. (v) They exploit the classical error correction and privacy amplification to extract the secure key rate.
After Charlie announces the measurement results, he cannot change the yield and QBER due to information causality 32 . The decoy-state method of estimating the yield and QBER of TF state with n-photon in phase-encoding basis is also true even for the post-selected phase-matching method, which has also been used in phase-matching QKD 15 . The GLLP analysis 24 
where Q ZZ is the gain in Z basis acquired directly from the experiment, f = 1.15 is the error correction coefficient.
For the RFI scheme 29, 33 , one can allow Alice and Bob to have different phase references which can be changed slowly (details can be found in Methods). Therefore, they can collect
where the probability of 
) describes eavesdropper Eve's information, there-
Compared with the BB84 encoding, all data of RFI scheme can be exploited to estimate parameter C 1 , which can be used to slow down the finite size effect. Alice and Bob can change M to acquire the maximum key rate without impacts on efficiency. The QBER of Z basis for TF state with one-photon e b1 ZZ ≡ 0 leads to
The secure key rate of practical TF-QKD using BB84 encoding changes with the dark count rate as shown in Fig. 3 . We use the practical parameters to simulate the secure key rate in Fig.   3 , where the efficiency of detector is η d = 40%, the loss coefficient of the channel is 0.2 dB/km and the optical error rate of system is e opt = 1%. The optical error rate is usually large due to the long-distance single-photon-type interference. We compare the secure key rates of practical TF-QKD using BB84 encoding and RFI scheme with the different optical error rate as shown in Fig. 4 . To show the advantage of TF-QKD, the efficiency and dark count rate of detector are assumed to be η d = 90% and p d = 10 −9 in Fig. 4 , respectively. In the simulation, both schemes can surpass the PLOB bound and tolerate the big optical error rate e opt . The key rate of TF-QKD with BB84
encoding will significantly decline with e opt rising, while the RFI scheme is robust. However, the long-distance phase-stabilization (it could not be a perfect match but is required to vary slowly) also exists since the relative phase changes too fast in the long-distance fiber or free-space channel.
The experimental demonstration of TF-QKD with independent lasers in Fig. 2(a) is a big challenge, although the MDI-QKD with two-photon BSM has been implemented over 404 km optical fiber 34 by using asymmetric four-intensity decoy-state method 35 . Compared with the twophoton BSM, greater technological challenges exist in the TF-QKD with single-photon BSM.
The frequency difference of two independent lasers is required more rigorously 12 . The phaselocking technique may be used to compensate the frequency difference. Importantly, the longdistance phase-stabilization technique is required to implement single-photon interference with phase matching. The RFI scheme can allow the phase mismatching. However, the relative phase change is still required to vary slowly. To rapidly implement the proof-of-principle TF-QKD experiment, we present a phase self-aligned TF-QKD with single laser interference as shown in Fig.   2 (b). The horizontal polarization optical pulse generated by Charlie is divided into two pulses by the polarization-maintaining beam splitter. By exploiting the π/2 rotation effect of Faraday mirror, the two pulses interfere after they go through the same path. Though the phase self-aligned scheme would be affected by the loss and noise, the frequency difference and long-distance phasestabilization problems are both solved 36 . An extra security analysis with untrusted source 37 should be used to defeat the attack from systems of Alice and Bob.
Discussion
In summary, we have proved that the TF-QKD can be regarded as a MDI-QKD with single-photon BSM. By introducing the Z basis encoding, the secret key extraction can exploit the tagging method of GLLP analysis and the decoy-state method. Compared with BB84 encoding, the RFI scheme has the advantages of increasing the data of parameter estimation and reducing the effect of phase drift. We should point out that the extra Y basis preparation in RFI scheme does not add additional operation due to the active phase randomization requirement, which is different from the traditional QKD. We propose a feasible experimental scheme to implement the proof-of-principle experimental demonstration. Note that, the security of this proof-of-principle experiment in Fig.   2b is not guaranteed with our current analysis, which requires a further security evaluation due to introducing untrusted source. Through simulation, we show that the secure key rate of practical TF-QKD can surpass the PLOB bound. The universally composable security with finite-key analysis needs to be considered in the future. Our proposal suggests an important avenue for practical high-speed and long-distance QKD without detector vulnerabilities. During the preparation of this paper and posting it on the arXiv, we became aware of some important works [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] of TF-QKD.
Methods
MDI-QKD with single-photon BSM. For the case of entanglement-based protocol with the entangled state |ψ t = √ 1 − t |0 |1 + √ t |1 |0 , the joint quantum state of Alice and Bob can be given by
For the threshold detector and lossy channel, the TF state |00 AB , |01 AB , |10 AB and |11 AB will all have single-photon Bell state clicks. Due to the single-photon BSM of Charlie, the photon number of TF state will collapse to three events, namely vacuum, one-photon and two-photon.
The corresponding probability can be expressed as
where the expression of q 2 is acquired by the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference of two-photon. The
is the transmittance between Alice (Bob) and Charlie.
For the case of prepare-and-measure protocol corresponding to entanglement-based protocol with the entangled state |ψ t = √ 1 − t |0 |1 + √ t |1 |0 , the density matrix of TF state in the Z basis is
which means a mixture of photon number states for TF state in the Z basis. The TF state of Z basis is the product state of Alice's and Bob's quantum state. The density matrix of TF state with one-photon in the Z basis is
which needs one of Alice and Bob prepares |0 as logic bit 0 and the other prepares |1 as logic bit
1.
The density matrix of TF state in the X basis can be written as
|+x, +x AB +x, +x| + |+x, −x AB +x, −x|
Thereinto, we have
which means a coherent superposition of photon number state for TF state in the X basis. If Alice and Bob jointly perform QND measurement on TF state to implement photon-number-resolving, we have
where ρ ) is the yield given that Alice and Bob choose Z (X) basis and TF state contains one-photon. Alice and Bob can know the locations of the TF state with one-photon by using the QND measurement, they could discard all other states and apply error correction and privacy amplification only to the TF state with one-photon. In this case with BB84 encoding, they can achieve a key rate of 20, 21 
For the TF state with one-photon in the Z basis, we have e b1 ZZ ≡ 0 since we only have the case of Alice's logic bit 0 (1) and Bob's logic bit 1 (0) corresponding to quantum state |01 |10 .
However, if we assume that Alice and Bob can know the QBER of TF state with one-photon in the X basis, one can acquire the secure key in the Z basis without Alice and Bob knowing the locations (QND measurement) of the TF state with one-photon by using the GLLP analysis 24 . The secure key rate can be given by
where the parameter q 1 should be calculated by using the decoy-state method, for example, we choose three value of t in the Z basis.
TF-QKD with phase-encoding coherent state. In order to make Alice and Bob know the QBER of TF state with one-photon in the X basis without the requirement of QND measurement, we need to consider the case of phase-randomized coherent state
where the global phases of Alice's coherent state |α A = |e iθ √ µ A and Bob's |e
should be randomized and have a fixed phase difference δ. Therefore, we have
For the X basis encoding, we have
where the global phases of Alice's and Bob's coherent state should be equal and randomized.
It can be realized by using post-selected phase-matching method for phase-randomized coherent state introduced in the original TF-QKD 12 and phase-matching QKD 15 . If we consider the photon number space of TF state given that the global phases of Alice's coherent state and Bob's are randomized and have a fixed phase difference, the density matrix can be given by
which is similar with the phase encoding phase-randomized coherent state in the traditional decoystate QKD 26, 27 . Therefore, the decoy state method can be used for estimating the yield and QBER of TF state with one-photon.
For phase-randomized coherent state used for Z basis encoding, we have
We need |0 as logic bit 0 and |1 as logic bit 1, therefore the efficient TF state with one-photon in Z basis only results from the case of logic bit 0 A 1 B and 1 A 0 B with the probability 2t(1 − t)µe −µ .
For simulation, we consider the case without Charlie's disturbance. In the Z basis of practical TF-QKD, by going through the quantum channel and beam splitter, we have (1 − t) 2 probability of quantum state
t(1 − t) probability of quantum state
and t 2 probability of quantum state
Here, we have θ A ∈ [0, 2π) and θ B ∈ [0, 2π), L and R represent the left detector and right detector of Charlie, respectively. The gain Q ZZ and QBER E ZZ of practical TF-QKD can be given by
and
For phase-encoding basis of practical TF-QKD, by going through the quantum channel and beam splitter, we have 1/4 probability of quantum state
where h A , h B ∈ {0, 1} represent basis X and Y , g A , g B ∈ {0, 1} represent logic bit 0 and 1 given that the intensities of Alice's and Bob's are λ and χ, respectively, λ, χ ∈ {ν/2, ω/2, 0}. Here, we
are the gain and QBER that Alice and Bob choose basis h A and h B when they send the global phase θ A and θ B optical pulses with intensities λ and χ, respectively.
Here,
when we assume √ η → 0 and p d → 0.
Obviously, we can directly estimate the yield Y 1ZZ TF by using the data of phase-encoding basis given that one of Alice and Bob sends intensity 0. We define λ ⊎ χ as the intensity set when Alice and Bob send intensity λ and χ phase-randomized coherent state. Therefore, Q ⊎ 0} and {0 ⊎ 0}, which can be written as
The Y 
We assume that the optical error rate e opt of X basis exists due to the single-photon interference. For simplicity, we assume that the optical error rate is introduced by the phase misalignment 12 .
Here, a fixed phase difference between Alice's and Bob's global phase is δ 0 = arccos(1 − 2e opt ).
By using the post-selected phase-matching method in practical TF-QKD with BB84 encoding, . They can be given by
Due to the random phase shifting, there is still an intrinsic QBER because the random phases are not perfectly matched. If e opt = 0.03, we have δ 0 = 0.35 and E ν XX ∼ 3.6%. By using the decoy-state mentod 26, 27 , the yield Y 1XX TF
and QBER e b1 XX can be given by
is the QBER of TF state with vacuum in phase-encoding basis.
For six-state encoding 28 , the probability that both bit flip and phase shift occurs can be given 
To simplify, we assume that those cases of qubit preparation with relative phase modulation are symmetrical since the random phase is unknown before Charlie performs single-photon BSM.
Therefore, we abtain a = e 
. Note that β A and β B are the phases of intrinsic degree of freedom between |0 and |1 and can vary slowly in the virtual protocol with RFI theory. The key rate of single-photon with RFI theory is given by
) quantifies the information of Eve's knowledge, pa-
The value C can be defined as
which is independent of phase drifting β A (β B ) and can just be used to bound Eve's information.
However, the phase drifting will add the QBER of X basis, which will decrease the key rate of BB84 encoding. Thereinto, E XX(Y Y,XY,Y X) is the QBER given that Alice and Bob choose
basis, which can be written as
One can acquire the maximum value C = 2 in the ideal case and I E (C = 2) = 0 if the phase difference β is fixed. For phase change from β to β + ∆β, ∆β ∈ [0, 2π] (uniformity variation), we
We can see that C is only related to phase change ∆β and is not related to phase difference β in theory. The value C will decrease with ∆β increasing.
In the practical TF-QKD with RFI scheme, we define that Q 
By using the decoy-state method, the lower and upper bounds of yield
The lower and upper bounds of QBER e 
For the practical TF-QKD with RFI scheme, we need to calculate the minimum value of C 1 k .
Therefore, for the value
we have
XXk , e 
the parameters e 
